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Abstract
Currently, security appears to be one of the strongest sales arguments for software vendors all
over the world. No other sector of the software industry has undergone a similar wave of mergers
and acquisitions recently as the producers of security software. Market analyses from all leading
business consultants predict heavy growth in the ﬁeld, and the annual ﬁgures of the major players
such as Checkpoint or Symantec back up these statements. However, the main mechanisms of the
industry still apply: Innovations have to be created and presented where demand is predicted and
the pressure to come up with new solutions is at an all time high. Consequently, the products
are pushed out the door as quickly as possible—and all too often before quality control has been
dedicated the amount of time and eﬀort that would have been implied by due diligence. While any
customer of security software expects the product to enhance the security of their environment, it
might actual pose new risks. Blind faith in these solutions can further contribute to compromising
the overall security of a network where a substantial advantage had been expected.
The purpose of this article is to shed a little light on the situation as it really is.
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This short note summarizes the themes surveyed by Dr. Jan Mu¨nther in his invited address. Dr.
Mu¨nther is an expert in network and information security who comes from industry, and we invited
him precisely because we were seeking an industrial perspective at the workshop. We are including
this summary in the Proceedings in the hope that it will provide researchers with clear and important
issues to take into account when considering new problems to undertake.
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1 Firewalls
Firewalls have been around for years now. Filtering traﬃc has become a
standard procedure, at least on the network perimeter, but with growing fre-
quency, segmentation on the link layer is also reﬂected on the network layer.
By their very nature, ﬁrewalls usually form neuralgic spots of a network—the
points where networks interconnect.
1.1 High Availability
Due to their character, they often form a single point of failure: If the ﬁrewall
fails, no traﬃc will be routed (or bridged). The ﬁrewall vendors have adressed
this problem with a plethora of High Availability (HA) solutions. However,
these are often far from fault free. One of the more popular solutions is based
on multicast MAC addresses usage, so a virtual physical adress receives all
the frames dedicated to the virtual IP address of a ﬁrewall cluster and then
forwards these to the actual cluster nodes.
One of the classical attack methods in a switched network is the usage of
spoofed ARP replies to overwrite the entries in a host’s ARP cache, so all
frames are ﬁrst directed to the attacker instead of the original target. This
method allows for sniﬃng in switched networks and the respective tools belong
to the toolbox of every determined attacker. To be able to capture the most
interesting traﬃc, the default gateway is usually one of the targets of the ARP
spooﬁng attack (a.k.a. ARP Poison Routing, APR)—usually the ﬁrewall.
The aforementioned HA solution however fails to handle the “restore pro-
cedure” the attacker typically executes after the attack properly. In this, the
attacker re-writes the original ARP entries through sending ARP replies with
the original MAC addresses to all hosts it had previously spoofed the entries
for. In the case of this ﬁrewalling software, the ﬁrewall stops routing packets
for any other host that had been targeted in the attack for about an hour and
a half. While the vendor has acknowledged the problem, no solution is known.
In another scenario, a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability of a certain
ﬁrewall was found. In case of HA deployment, a malicious attacker can take
out the ﬁrst node with one packet, then the other with a second, resulting in a
reboot and resynchronization period of some eight minutes. So much for HA.
Naturally, these weaknesses do not mean that HA deployments are coun-
terproductive or superﬂuous, but they cannot be counted upon as free from
ﬂaws or mitigate poor network design.
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1.2 In the Perimeter We Trust
One presumption is frequently encountered: The ﬁrewall protects the good
and trustworthy internal network(s) from the evil that is the Internet. Often,
ﬁrewalls are conﬁgured like semi-permeable membranes: While close to noth-
ing can get in, almost everything passes in the opposite direction, from the
inside to the outside.
However, such a protection scheme in no way keeps attackers from target-
ing the clients to gain a foothold in the network. Microsoft’s Internet Explorer
is still by far the most popular browser, despite being one of the most vulner-
able pieces of software ever written, judged by the number of public vulnera-
bilities that have been reported. A dedicated attacker can attempt to deliver
malicious active content on a web page through e.g. Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
and achieve code execution on a client, then retrieve a back-connecting back-
door from any given location on the net and let the client connect back to
another host the attacker controls, enabling him or her to interactively ex-
ecute commands on the remote machine. Given the protection level that is
often implemented in internal networks, the results can be catastrophic.
1.3 The Exotic Bonus
Another common misconception is the belief that the use of a non-ubiquituous
architecture or Operating System will keep the ﬁrewall itself from being com-
promised or from vulnerabilities being found. While the vast majority of
attackers surely concentrates on the more commonly found targets such as
Win32 or Linux systems on IA32 platforms, the more dedicated network ex-
plorers surely possess the ability to also reverse engineer the software images
of embedded devices based on ARM, PowerPC or other platforms—at least
those that the IDA Pro Disassembler supports. While it may keep the no-
torious “script kiddies” out, it will not stop a highly skilled and determined
person from taking a closer look at what you are running.
Quintessentially, ﬁrewalls are naturally not superﬂuous or pose a risk that
is not worth taking—all in all, they surely do more good than harm. However,
relying on them as a single security measure must be considered inadequate
in today’s attack scenarios. Despite the promises a lot of their vendors are
willing to make, they are not perfect—like any other piece of software.
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2 Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Prevention—The
IPS Dilemma
The ﬁrewall market is fairly saturated today. However, the task of a ﬁrewall
is protecting hosts from a remote takeover—it does not sound an alarm when
this has happened despite the traﬃc ﬁltering.
For this purpose, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been established
on the market. These function like network burglar alarms: Either based on
anomaly detection or more or less advanced pattern matching, they inform
their operators of potential security breaches. IDS devices are strictly passive,
oftentimes even deployed with only the RX wires of an Ethernet cable actu-
ally connected or through fully passive network taps, so they can neither be
detected nor abused.
Their passivity is their biggest problem, too. A lot of IDS systems remain
largely unmonitored and prove about as eﬀective as a “Hacking Forbidden”
sign on the door to the data center. Due to this, the idea for Intrusion Pre-
vention Systems was born—systems that actively terminate the connection
when a security breach has been detected, typically either through sending an
appropriately shaped RST ﬂagged TCP packet or an ICMP type 3 message of
varying codes. The usual placement of these systems is behind the ﬁrewalls,
directly before the servers they are supposed to protect. But, since in contrast
to their passive IDS brothers they need to actively produce network traﬃc,
they must be fully connected to the actual network the servers communicate
over. This makes them an attractive target—if an attacker manages to take
over the IPS system, a direct foothold inside the network behind the ﬁrewall,
directly before the servers has been found.
Unfortunately, this is far from theoretical. To detect typical attacks, IPS
and IDS systems have to decode traﬃc up to the application layer and under-
stand the logic of the high-level protocol to trigger an alert when its speciﬁ-
cations are violated. Everyone who has ever written a piece of software that
decoded a single protocol alone knows that this can become an immensely
complex task. Not too surprisingly, these “decoding engines” are sometimes
heavily bug ridden, and IPS devices do not make an exception.
One vendor has recently even been struck by a worm which has abused a
vulnerability in the protocol parsing engine of all their Intrusion Prevention
and Intrusion Detection software to control its victims.
Given these risks, do Intrusion Prevention devices really enhance your
networks security?
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3 Antivirus Software
Maybe the most common type of security software are the malware detecting
desktop and server products usually referred to as Antivirus (AV) Software.
Even this usually rather passive component of a security infrastructure can
become a risk of its own.
Some vendors are neglective with their update procedures. One even down-
loads a standard Win32 PE executable with a predictable name from a pre-
dictable location—and executes it without the veriﬁcation of any hash value
or other checks. When an attacker can fool the host into downloading the ﬁle
from a diﬀerent location, a diﬀerent ﬁle can be executed with the rights the
service runs under—which is normally Local NT Authority / System, resulting
in a complete takeover. One might argue that the AV software itself would
detect the backdoor. This is only partly true. A custom-written backdoor
that does not match any patterns or does not trigger any heuristics engine’s
alert will not get reported, and it is perfectly possible to adhere the original
updates the service expects to the backdoor program.
Other factors include vulnerable admistration interfaces to server-based AV
software, such as web-based conﬁguration consoles for virus scanners on mail
gateways. These are potentially prone to almost every attack vector known for
web applications to exist. Or antivirus software may be trusted with excessive
local user rights, which in case of the Win32 desktop applications may result
in the software being abused for the execution of Shatter Attacks to escalate
privileges locally.
4 Virtual Pirate Networks
Virtual Private Network products have triumphantly made their way into
common IT infrastructure. Typical uses include the linking of two networks
through an untrusted third network (typically the Internet) or allowing roam-
ing users (“road warriors”) the connection to the internal network from every
point in the world, as long as they can connect to the Internet. The two most
popular protocols for these purposes are the Point to Point Tunneling Pro-
tocol (PPTP) and the IETF standardized IPSecurity protocol suite (IPSec).
PPTP has been criticized due to usage of weak encryption for its authenti-
cation procedures (basically PPP and a GRE tunnel in combination, using
MS-CHAPv2 for the authentication itself).
IPSec has somewhat evolved as the industry standard. However, the key
exchange is executed through the ISAKMP protocol, which is immensely com-
plex. As mentioned earlier, the parsing of complex protocols is one of the most
J. Münther / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 142 (2006) 5–10 9
common sources of failures and thus vulnerabilities. The author has yet to
see any IPSec based Win32 VPN software that was not prone to one or more
classical buﬀer overﬂows due to ﬂaws in the ISAKMP parsing engine.
Another problem is the level of trust that network architects tend to grant
in VPNs. While the other end of the tunnel is usually not under the same con-
trol as the local network itself, fairly often the two are interconnected without
any second thoughts. While the Internet is seen as a hostile environment, the
roaming users or the remote network are all too often allowed to connect to
the private network without further ﬁltering or traﬃc inspection.
IPSec based VPNs can handle the authentication based on either certiﬁ-
cates or a shared secret, the latter essentially being a passphrase which is
used on both sides of a tunnel. The shared secret variant is often picked for
site-to-site connections. These are usually the connections of higher interest
for an attacker. However, the passphrase-based authentication is prone to the
same brute force or dictionary attacks as any other network service, whereas
a certiﬁcate in its complexity is close to impossible to guess.
While VPNs oﬀer some great possibilities, their speciﬁc vulnerabilities and
the attack vectors they create must always be taken into consideration. A
badly planned and possibly worse setup VPN can turn into a security hazard
instead of a surplus.
5 Conclusion
Security software is just as prone to vulnerabilities as all other software, despite
keywords such as “secure”, “safe” or “anti” being used in its advertising. No
software can replace decent planning and reasonable network design as well
as good system administration—and deﬁnitely not mitigate generic security
problems deriving from custom software.
Since particularly security software is typically used in sensitive areas of
IT, certain precautions should apply. As a general rule, never rely on a single
line of defense. If it fails, the entire security model is compromised, and all
products can be ﬂawed. Heterogenity can be a blessing!
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